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To achieve cooperation-the essence of society-there must be wide-
spread compliance with society's established moral order. Professor Jen-
kins identifies forces that motivate the members of an individual society to
such compliance: a sense of moral responsibility, an apparatus of legal
liability, and the pressure of group accountability.
By moral responsibility, Jenkins means answerability to one's self, by
legal liability, answerability to law; and by accountability, answerability to
colleagues. Several generations of social scientists from the "Weber
school" have argued that Americans do not share any beliefs, meanings,
and values. By surveying American culture, Professor Jenkins finds a de-
cline in public morality and an increasing reliance upon law enforcement.
He attributes this decline and shift to the failure of "collegial groups" to
hold members accountable, i.e. to exercise peer pressure. Jenkins includes
among "collegial groups" professional associations, labor unions, scientific
laboratories, and philanthropic foundations.
Professor Jenkins, a former President of AMINTAPHIL, suggests that
improvement in the operation of the law will not prove insufficient to stem
the tendency toward anomie in American society. To increase accountabil-
ity, Professor Jenkins calls for "collegial groups" to resume a major
amount of responsibility for their members.
ACCOUNTABILITY, LEGALITY AND THE
SOCIAL ORDER
IREDELL JENKINS*
Accepting the rough but recognizable distinction between ethics and
morality, this essay deals exclusively with issues of the latter type. It has
nothing to say about the semantics of such ethical terms as "good,"
"right," "ought" and the like. More than enough ink has been spilled on
these verbal quarrels, and I do not intend to add to this mass of philo-
sophical detritus. My interest is directed instead toward the practical
problem of how-by what means-people are led or driven, motivated or
compelled, to adhere to established moral rules and standards.
More specifically, my theme is the public morality and the sad decline
* Professor of Philosophy, emeritus, University of Alabama; Author, Social Order and the
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in the quality of this that is now so widely proclaimed and lamented.
Since my concern is practical, this essay will focus on two issues: the
forces that are required to sustain this indispensable civic virtue and the
causes that are responsible for its present decline and virtual demise. But
I shall also, in concluding, have something to say about the measures
that we must take if we are to correct the present deplorable state of
affairs.
I. THE MEANS BY WHICH PUBLIC MORALITY Is ACHIEVED
But first, what is the public morality? The phrase has a remote and
abstract sound, but I think that what we mean by it is simple and con-
crete. We want all persons, whatever their station in life and whatever
their social role, to do their jobs honestly and diligently. We want them
to abide by the rules of the game, to uphold the ideals they proclaim, and
to conform to the standards they profess - that is, to practice what they
preach. And finally, we want them to be brought to book and punished
for their transgressions.
Now, how are these goals achieved? By what means is the public mo-
rality kept sound and secure? The answer I shall suggest consists of two
theses. The first of these holds that there are three principal instruments
- three forces and agencies - that serve this end: these are the sense of
moral responsibility, the apparatus of legal liability, and the pressure of
group accountability. My second thesis holds that these three are all spe-
cies of a single genus, that of answerability. It is upon these that we must
rely to uphold the public morality. I must now put flesh on the bare
bones of these two theses, and I shall take them in reverse order.
A. Answerability
Answerability means that one must bear the consequences of one's ac-
tions. People are answerable for what they say and do, and for what
ensues upon their words and deeds. Individuals must acknowledge that
they are the authors of their acts and of the outcomes to which their acts
lead; they must be prepared to explain and justify themselves; and they
must be obliged to pay for their sins and errors. Such answerability is the
bedrock upon which society is built. Men live in space and time, and
what they do impinges upon others and makes an impact on the world.
A casual or malicious word can ruin a person's reputation; reckless driv-
ing can maim a child; negligence in maintenance work can wreck a train
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or plane; an incompetent diagnosis or bungled operation can kill a pa-
tient. In sum, since we are active agents, we must answer for the differ-
ence that we make in the course of events - for the effects that we cause:
responsibility, liability, and accountability are the means that we employ
to this end - they are all that we have. This is their generic nature.
B. Responsibility, Liability, Accountability
And now what of their specific characters? How do they differ? We
have seen for what one must answer: it is for ones actions and their con-
sequences. I now suggest that the differences among responsibility, lia-
bility, and accountability are to be found by asking to whom one must
answer. They are distinguished by the principals - the individuals, in-
stitutions, or groups - to whom an answer is owed. So we ask this: for
each of these species, to whom is one answerable?
For the first two species, I think the solutions are obvious. The re-
sponsible person answers to himself. He who is liable answers to the law.
But to whom is one accountable? My suggestion is that he who is ac-
countable answers to his colleagues: that is, he answers to an identifiable
group of persons with whom he is associated by a common interest or
function. I shall refer to such groups as collegial groups. In filling out
these identifications, I shall pay particular attention to accountability,
which is, I think, the most important of the three and the failure of which
is at the root of our troubles with the public morality.
Responsibility is a moral virtue, or trait of character, in the Aristote-
lian sense. It is a habit of attitude and action, leading one to be con-
cerned for the consequences that he causes and thus responsibility leads
individuals to take pains that these consequences should be at best benefi-
cial and at least not harmful. The responsible person has the welfare of
others at heart. He anticipates the possible outcomes of his actions, and
he discharges his obligations in a voluntary and conscientious manner.
In short, to be responsible is to care and to take care.
Responsibility is intensely personal and informal: one answers to him-
self and to his own values and standards; that for which he must answer
is determined by his own character and commitments; and irresponsibil-
ity - the failure to answer properly - is punished by conscience, re-
morse, and the sense of guilt.
Liability is a legal state. Realizing that the moral virtue of responsibil-
ity is insufficient to ensure that men will act with care, society introduces
an additional factor into the equation. This is law. Eschewing the effort
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to lead men to act responsibly before the event, law holds them liable for
the consequences of their actions after the event. The legal apparatus can
do little to instill in men a spirit of benevolence and concern. But it can,
by holding men liable, do a great deal to induce them to act with fore-
thought and caution. And it can punish them for their violations and
force them to make reparation to those they have injured by any manner.
In sharp contrast with responsibility, liability is impersonal and for-
mal: one answers to that abstract entity, the law; that for which one
must answer is determined by the body of the laws; and violation of the
law's edicts - the failure to answer properly - is punished by such official
sanctions as fines, damages, and imprisonment.
And now what of accountability? I define this as an answer owed to a
collegial group of which one is a member. I am using the term "collegial"
very broadly and in accord with its derivation: collegial means having to
do with one's colleagues or partners: in sum, with a definite group of
persons with whom one is associated through some special bond or rela-
tionship. And the term "collegial group" in turn refers to any one of that
vast and miscellaneous array of groups that have some specific rule and
function in society such as: Industry, finance, agriculture, or commerce;
the professions, crafts, or trades; educators, journalists, artists, or
scientists.
Those persons with shared interests and responsibilities soon organize
in order to speak with one voice and to better serve both society and
themselves. Such groups vary greatly in character. They may be large or
small; they may be tightly or loosely organized; they may serve only one
purpose or several; their members, as individuals, may be closely similar
or widely divergent. Familiar examples of collegial groups are profes-
sional associations, labor unions, trade and industrial organizations; cul-
tural, artistic, and scientific federations; legislatures, philanthropic
foundations, political parties, and police forces; and glee clubs or theatre
groups.
It is of the essence of collegial groups that they are Janus-faced: they
look in two directions, both outward toward their society and inward
toward their members. In the former aspect, they are public and func-
tional bodies: each has a specific role and responsibility, tasks to dis-
charge, values to further, and standards to uphold. Society looks to these
groups to serve its needs and oversee their members. In the latter aspect,
collegial groups are private and protective bodies: they counsel and serve
their members, further their personal interests, protect them against un-
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due interference and harassment, and seek to strengthen their own posi-
tions in the social order.
These two sets of purposes and standards are always present and well-
known, even if they have never been explicitly formulated and promul-
gated: they constitute both the raison d'etre and the bonding force of the
group. In short, every collegial group has its code. We have encountered
the character and importance of such codes in such forms as "the honor
of the regiment," "the word of a gentlemen," noblesse oblige, the Hippo-
cratic Oath, "the frontier code," initiation rites, the Code of Legal Eth-
ics, and the charters and by-laws of associations. Further, the
Constitution of the United States is best seen not as a written document,
but as just such a code, to be adhered to and maintained by all of those
holding public office, and indeed, by all the citizens. To be accountable is
to be answerable to the tenets of the code to which the group is commit-
ted. In joining a collegial group, one seals a pact with it and its members
to abide by its rules, respect its standards, and promote its purposes.
And he must answer for any failure to do so.
Accountability is thus collegial and inter-personal. One answers to his
colleagues; that for which he must answer is defined by the group code;
and any failure to answer properly - any deviation from this code - the
failure to answer properly - is punished by sanctions ranging from a
token fine through censure, deprivation of certain privileges, and demo-
tion, to expulsion.
C. Accountability: The Most Effective Means to Achieve
Public Morality
I come now to the heart of my argument, and I want to advance two
further theses. The first of these holds that accountability always has
been and always must be the strongest factor in assuring that men will
answer for their actions - that they will do their jobs honestly and dili-
gently, abide by established rules and standards, and be punished for
their delinquencies. The reason for this primacy is simple. As we have
seen, the only other available forces are personal morality and public law.
The former of these is too variable among individuals, too easily swayed
by passion or self-interest, and too short in its reach. We act responsibly
only toward those who are quite close to us, and it is difficult to care and
take care for distant strangers and remote consequences.
Similarly, law is too weak and uncertain in its grasp, too easily evaded,
and too erratic in its application to be effective. And even at its best,
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legal liability does not motivate men positively to act in approved ways,
but only negatively to avoid getting caught acting in forbidden ways.
The significance of accountability lies in the fact that it can reach fur-
ther than responsibility and can grasp more firmly than liability. This is
possible because collegial groups occupy a position intermediate between
the solitariness of conscience and the formalism of law. The members of
such groups are our fellows, with whom we are closely associated in com-
mon pursuits: we want their esteem, and they can serve as both a public
conscience and as private officers to detect and report violations of the
group code. It is to their collegial groups that most people feel the clos-
est ties and from which they receive the greatest influence. It is the fam-
ily, the neighborhood and native region, the social or ethnic class, the
peer group, and especially the vocational world - whether professional,
commercial, industrial, political, military, educational, artistic, or agri-
cultural - in which people move and work and have their being that
puts its stamp most clearly upon them and holds them most closely in its
grip. To the extent that a person honors a set of values and a code of
behavior, these are largely the bequest - quite literally the imprinting -
of those collegial groups to which he is the most attached, upon which he
most depends, and which can, if they will, most easily detect his short-
comings and bring him to book.
II. THE CAUSE BEHIND THE DECLINE OF PUBLIC MORALITY
If this assessment is correct, then we of the present have cause for
concern.
A. The Failure of Collegial Groups
My second thesis holds that collegial groups are failing lamentably to
live up to their public responsibilities. They are supposed to serve the
society conscientiously in their allotted roles: to this end, they see that
their members are properly qualified, discharge their duties diligently,
and do not abuse their positions. But collegial groups are doing none of
these things adequately. They show little or no regard for the behavior of
their members, and even less for the calibre of the work that they do or
the services that they offer. Men are treating these groups simply as in-
struments to further their private interests: as a cover for their actions,
and as a shield for their sins.
And how do the groups respond to this abuse? Unfortunately, they
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abet it. They make no more than an empty pretense of enforcing their
rules and standards, watching over the qualifications and conduct of
their members, or punishing even the grossest violations of their codes.
Instead, they rush to the defense of these members when their transgres-
sions are exposed and retribution threatens. The evidence for this is
everywhere, and its recital makes a doleful tale. Acting on the maxim
that example is more efficacious than precept, I will cite a few familiar
cases.
It may be common knowledge that certain lawyers engage in grossly
unethical and illegal acts, but it is extremely rare for a bar association to
move to disbar or even censure a guilty member. Similarly, a doctor may
be known by his colleagues to be incompetent, to perform unnecessary
operations, to overcharge his patients, or to cheat on Medicaid. Yet it is
unusual for such doctors to be impugned and exposed by their col-
leagues, much less lose their licenses to practice. In a different context,
captains of industry are found guilty by the law of the most venal acts -
fraud, bribery, price-setting, unfair competition, corruption, and monop-
olistic practices - without in the least losing caste with their associates
or suffering any group sanction. Again, a union member may be well
known to do shoddy work, to malinger, to violate company work rules,
to create disturbances that interrupt production, or even to engage in
sabotage. But his union will probably come to his defense and threaten a
strike if any effort is made to discipline him.
In order not to appear holier than thou, it must be acknowledged that
this virus has even infected the academic profession. One hears of cases
where it is common gossip that a teacher is incompetent, uncooperative
with his department and colleagues, abusive of his students, and neglect-
ful of his most basic duties: but all of this will be overlooked or denied,
and he will be protected by his faculty group and professional associa-
tion. And to balance this budget of blame, university administrations
often behave in this same manner. A particular administrator may be
known to fail in all of the above mentioned ways, but all that he suffers is
a lateral arabesque to a functionless position that still leaves him with an
impressive title, a large office, a handsome salary, and two secretaries
who have little to do. And now even research scientists, those supposed
apostles of pure truth, are faking their experiments and falsifying their
data in order to get a desired result.
The most familiar chapter in this tale of woe is that which recounts the
many and varied delinquencies of public officials, from the President
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down. But this is such a painful saga that it is simple kindness to pass
over it quickly. So I will limit myself to one instance. Both houses of the
Congress recently established stringent codes of conduct and announced
that any suspected violations of these codes would be vigorously investi-
gated and punished. Shortly thereafter, a senator was found guilty and
sentenced to prison for accepting bribes, selling his influence, and gener-
ally corrupting his office. But he resigned with the praises of his col-
leagues ringing in his ears and a pension of $45,000 in his pocket. These
and numerous other cases of official immunity from the wages of sin can
be summarized in a word. The old maxim that "the king can do no
wrong" has not lost its force. It is only the seat of sovereignty that has
changed.
When those who are guilty of gross violations of duty and decency go
unpunished, enjoying instead their ill-gotten gains, men of good will but
weak resolve are easily led to follow their example by flouting their codes
and feathering their nests as best they can. Indeed, they are virtually
persuaded that they must act so in simple self-protection. Once estab-
lished, this infection spreads rapidly through the body politic. For as
another old saw tells us, it doesn't take many rotten apples to spoil the
barrel.
The social illness of which these cases are symptoms is obvious: colle-
gial groups of all kinds have turned inward upon themselves, neglecting
their functions in the social order and concerned only to strengthen their
own and their members' positions therein. This tendency toward intro-
version is endemic in collegial groups: it is the inevitable consequence of
their dual status as at once public and private. Tension between these
roles is inescapable, and a stable equilibrium is as elusive as a balance
among nuclear powers. But if my reading of the evidence is sound, what
is now demoralizing our public life is a radical imbalance in this relation-
ship. In turning altogether inward, collegial groups renounce their social
character and purpose; and in failing to hold their members accountable,
they repudiate their own obligation to be answerable to the society. In
short, collegial groups are ceasing to be functional bodies and are becom-
ing mere benevolent and protective orders.
B. The Replacement of Group Accountability with Legal Liability
Faced with this renunciation by collegial groups and their members of
the standards and responsibilities imposed by the codes they still piously
proclaim, our society appears to have lost all hope of breathing new life
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into the moribund body of collegial accountability. As a result, we have
resorted to the desperate measure of assimilating collegial accountability
into legal liability. Since collegial groups fail to hold either their mem-
bers accountable to themselves or themselves answerable to the society,
we have decided to hold both of them liable to the law and its penalties.
To this end, we spell out in strictly legal terms and in full detail exactly
what is permitted and what is forbidden, the rules that must be followed,
the duties that must be performed, and the sanctions that will be imposed
- if guilt can ever be proved.
To realize the extent of this legalization of accountability, we need
only examine any of the innumerable documents that govern the rela-
tions between collegial groups and their members and between these
groups and the society at large. Typical examples are the Code of Legal
Ethics formulated by the ABA; the similar charters and by-laws of other
professional, civic, and commercial organizations; the contracts between
labor and management; the elaborate shop rules that prevail in any large
industrial plants; and the detailed criteria and procedures that now gov-
ern the granting of tenure and promotion, or the imposition of discipli-
nary measures, to university faculty members. And one must especially
remember how very often disputes regarding any of these relationships
eventually wind up in courts of law.
This process of legalization is most dramatically brought home by the
following simple experiment: first, read the ancient Hippocratic Oath, a
perfect example of a Collegial Code. Compare this with the Code of
Medical Ethics as promulgated - and continually revised - by the
AMA, a perfect example of a legal document. Then consider these inter-
esting facts: immediately before receiving their diplomas, all medical stu-
dents repeat in unison and pledge themselves to abide by the Hippocratic
Oath. Just a few minutes later, immediately after receiving their diplo-
mas and becoming full-fledged Doctors of Medicine, they become subject
to the Code of Medical Ethics!
III. SOLUTION: A BETrER BALANCE BETWEEN LAW AND
COLLEGIAL GROUPS
Given the present state of affairs, this steady replacement of collegial
accountability with legal liability is understandable. But it is also poten-
tially fatal, since, as I have sufficiently argued it is just such accountabil-
ity that is necessarily the strongest support of the public morality and
hence of social order and harmony. So if we are to repair the disarray of
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the present, we must desist from such reductionism and concentrate our
efforts on reviving collegial accountability and making it again an effec-
tive force. To this end, I think that there are two lines of action that
must be taken and two general conditions that must be met if success is
to be achieved. These are so closely interdependent that they must pro-
ceed simultaneously and step by step.
A. The Need for the Law to Restrict Itself
On the one hand, the law must pull in its horns and stop goring the
other elements of the social order with its continual intrusion into their
affairs. As matters now stand, the federal courts and regulatory agencies
exercise a virtually constant supervision and interference into the deci-
sions and actions of all other social agencies and institutions - the mani-
fold of collegial groups that do the actual work of the society. As a result
of these practices, the legal apparatus is taking upon itself far more re-
sponsibilities than it can effectively discharge. Legal officials of various
sorts, and especially federal judges, routinely issue rulings and orders on
matters in which they have little or no experience or expertise. In acting
so, law is not only over-taxing itself; what is even worse, it is undermin-
ing both the incentive and the opportunity of collegial groups to fill their
proper roles in the social order. If the law insists upon supervising the
detailed operations of collegial groups and having the last word in every
context, then these groups will respond in one of two ways: they will
resist and evade court orders to the last ditch, seeking to have their own
way and to do their jobs as they think best; or they will give over all
effort to be active, effective, and innovative in the conduct of their affairs
and will become purely supine bodies, servants - slaves? - of the law.
So courts must relax their grip and restrict their reach, leaving more free-
dom and discretion to collegial groups.
B. The Need For Collegial Groups to Accept Social Responsibility
Concurrently with this easing of the grip of the law, collegial groups
must reform themselves and redraft their codes in such a way as to prop-
erly discharge the responsibilities and authority that are now to be re-
stored to them. We have seen earlier the function of these groups as a
whole and the absolute dependence of a sound society on the inculcation
by them of a strong sense of accountability in their members. It was
precisely the failure of collegial groups to discharge their social functions
and to police their members that led to judicial activism in the first place.
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Judges did not make a grab for power for power's sake; rather, they in-
tervened and took charge of matters - usually reluctantly - only when
they found themselves forced to do so because of the deplorable condi-
tions that prevailed in many contexts of the society and the refusal of
collegial groups to achieve reforms by taking the actions that were their
responsibility: obvious examples are the conditions in mental hospitals
and prisons and the treatment of their inmates, the desegregation of pub-
lic facilities, equal opportunities for women and minorities in education
and employment.
Anyone who has given the slightest study to this problem will know
that success of the law in achieving its goals depends entirely on the ac-
tive cooperation of the collegial groups that are chiefly responsible for the
management of affairs, and hence for the conditions that prevail, in these
and other social contexts. When such cooperation is forthcoming, much
good can be done and the situation can be greatly improved. When it is
lacking, there is delay and evasion, and little results save sound and fury.
C. The Necessity of a Proper Balance
The simple truth is that law - positive or civil law - is only a secon-
dary and supplemental principle of order: that is, an agency or instru-
ment that serves to assure the public morality in the sense already given
to that term. It supports and supplements other more primary and inti-
mate principles of order - collegial groups of all sorts and sizes. But
law cannot supplant or supersede these, for it is they that do the actual
day to day work of the society and play the leading role in forming the
character of men and impressing upon them sound habits of mind and
action. And it is this inculcation of moral responsibility and collegial
accountability that transforms the material of raw human nature into
social beings fit to be subjects of the law. In sum, law is sovereign, but it
is neither autonomous nor omnicompetent. It can issue orders at will,
but others must implement them. And it is the implementation that
gives rise to problems and upon which success or failure depends.
The well-being of a society depends upon a sound balance between law
on the one hand and the manifold of collegial groups on the other. Law
must assert its sovereignty to assure that collegial groups come up to the
mark and discharge their social responsibilities in an honest and effective
manner. But it must not abuse this sovereignty by dictating to the
groups the precise standards to which they must adhere or the exact pro-
cedures that they must follow. Collegial groups must insist upon the
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freedom to organize their efforts and to do their jobs as their professional
judgment deems best. But they must not abuse this freedom in a manner
to frustrate the purposes of the law or to neglect their social functions in
order to pursue only their private interests.
It should now be clear that what we confront here is a particularly
complex case of the Aristotelian maxim that all virtue - personal, civic,
and political - consists in a mean between two extremes. It is simple
and convincing to advance this as a theory. It is equally so to cite ab-
stract examples, such as the famous dictum that courage is the mean
between cowardice and foolhardiness. Yet in even so seemingly simple a
case as this, it can be very difficult to determine what constitutes courage
in a concrete situation. There are too many factors to be weighed: the
strength of the two parties, the values at stake, the possible consequences
of victory or defeat, what duty demands and intelligence recommends,
and so and on.
In the problem that concerns us - the balance between law and colle-
gial groups - all of these difficulties are magnified many times over. In
this context, it is difficult to define the mean even in very general terms as
a balance that allows for a great deal of variation. It is far more difficult
to achieve this mean in practice. And it is quite impossible to establish
this balance in a permanent and stable state: one must allow for a con-
stant shifting in response to changes in both internal and external
conditions.
The most that we can hope for in any large-scale relationship between
law and some collegial group is that in the course of time the two parties
will come to understand each other's purposes and problems and so will
be moved to cooperate in a friendly manner in the pursuit of what usu-
ally - but not always - turns out to be a common goal.
Seeking to illuminate and test these general ideas in an actual occur-
rence, I have in recent years made a detailed study of the landmark case
of Wyatt v. Stickney, in which federal judge Frank Johnson assumed vir-
tually complete control of the Alabama Mental Health System, which
was in a deplorable condition - as were most such institutions through-
out the country. This suit was first filed in 1971. It went on for some
sixteen years, and was terminated only in the fall of 1986, when the court
relinquished its jurisdiction and returned the mental hospitals to state
control. The point that stands out the most clearly and constitutes the
most valuable lesson in any such study is this: the vast, slow and com-
plex process of implementing the court orders proved to be an unparal-
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leled learning experience for all of the parties involved in the case:
plaintiffs, defendants, judge, attorneys, amici. Each of the parties sepa-
rately realized that he could not have his way completely; they had to
compromise. And all of them collectively realized that they could expect
neither perfection nor permanence in any context that was as complex
and variable as the operation of a mental hospital, where emergencies
and the unexpected are the norm. The same general conclusions hold
true for any social problem where courts and collegial groups find them-
selves in conflicts that must be transformed into mutual sympathy and
cooperation. The more quickly this lesson is taken to heart, the easier
will life be for all of them.
In the abstract terms that I used earlier, courts must realize that
although they can use their sovereignty to issue peremptory orders, their
real effectiveness is limited by the fact that they are neither autonomous
nor omnicompetent: they must depend upon collegial groups to carry
out their orders. Collegial groups must realize that though courts cannot
implement their own orders, they can always exert their sovereignty by
issuing yet stricter orders and standards, by exerting yet closer supervi-
sion, and by imposing yet sterner sanctions. In sum, both over-zealous-
ness by courts and stubbornness by collegial groups are equally fruitless.
IV. CONCLUSION
My point of departure in this essay was the serious decline in the pub-
lic morality and the general social disarray that are such conspicuous
features of the present scene. I argued that the proximate cause of these
problems was the collapse of collegial accountability as an effective social
force. This in turn resulted from the failure of collegial groups to per-
form their public functions conscientiously or to police their members.
These failures left gaping social vacuums: important tasks went unper-
formed, pressing problems were passed over, and deplorable conditions
were ignored. When this neglect persisted, the law finally moved in, as-
serted its sovereignty, assumed control of the collegial groups in question
- school boards, mental hospitals, public and private employers, and so
on - and issued stringent orders to them, commanding them to take the
actions that they should have long since taken on their own initiative.
Thus began the process of the legalization of collegial accountability.
This was undoubtedly necessary, and it can show some notable successes.
But it has demanded a high price in human energy and skill and in physi-
cal and economic resources. Further, it has too often led to disruption,
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
784 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
ineffectiveness, and even violence. The reason for this is simple. Once a
judge has taken jurisdiction of a case and assumed control of the opera-
tion of the collegial group in question, he too often goes too far and issues
detailed orders that, being beyond his experience and competence, are
unrealistic and inappropriate. And this leads to the conflicts and dead-
locks discussed above.
The solution to all of these problems is to establish a mean, or balance,
between the powers of the law and those of collegial groups. The law has
the power of its sovereignty and so can issue orders more or less at will.
Collegial groups have the power of those who alone can implement these
orders, transforming word into deed. So it is incumbent upon courts to
issue orders that are reasonable and realizable. It is equally incumbent
upon collegial groups to implement these orders as effectively and hon-
estly as their limited resources allow.
I do not pretend that these will be easy tasks. In addition to all of the
difficulties already noted in establishing a mean and balance between law
and collegial groups, there remains one over-riding threat.
If power does not necessarily corrupt those who wield it, it certainly
does tend to seduce them.
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